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Schumpeter’s unique type of evolutionary analysis can hardly be understood unless we recognise 
that he developed it in relation to a study of the strength and weaknesses of the Walrasian form of 
Neoclassical Economics. This development was largely performed in his first book Wesen und 
Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie. This German-language book - which in English 
might be called ‘Essence and Scope of Theoretical Economics’ - was published a century ago (in 
1908). Different readings of Wesen provide many clues about the emergence and structure of 
Schumpeter’s programme for teaching and research. This programme included a modernisation of 
static economic analysis but he concentrated on the difficult extension of economic analysis to 
cover economic evolution. Schumpeter thought that this extension required a break with basic 
neoclassical assumptions, but he tried to avoid controversy by presenting it as only requiring the 
introduction of innovative entrepreneurs into the set-up of the Walrasian System. Actually, he could 
easily define the function of his type of entrepreneurs in this manner, but the analysis of the overall 
process of evolution required a radical reinterpretation of the system of general economic 
equilibrium. He thus made clear that he could not accept the standard interpretation of the quick 
Walrasian process of adaptation (tâtonnement). Instead, he saw the innovative transformation of 
routine behaviour as a relatively slow and conflict-ridden process. This reinterpretation helped him 
to sketch out his theory of economic business cycles as reflecting the waveform process of 
economic evolution under capitalism. 
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1. Introduction
It is presently about 100 years since Schumpeter wrote his ﬁrst book. This book
is largely about the foundations of analytical economics and it was published
when he was 25. Therefore, the following formulations by Stanley Fischer
(1987, 235–6) may read as if they describe his book:
Foundations is the work of a 25-year-old. There are signs of youth in the ea-
gerness to proselytize for the new mathematical faith and [it is] overreach-
ing in trying to impose an entirely coherent theme on the material. But the
book bears the unmistakable command of the economics of his material, at
home with technique, and most remarkably for a young man in a hurry,
thoroughly familiar and patient with the literature. It is, as Schumpeter no
doubt remarked, a remarkable performance.
Schumpeter’s praise, however, was not for himself but for his friend Paul
Samuelson. Like Schumpeter, Samuelson ﬁnished his PhD thesis at the age
of 25. At that age, both of them had ploughed through an enormous litera-
ture with an emphasis on the underlying formal structures and analytical tools.
They had found widespread confusion and lacking recognition of the basic
unity under the multiform surface of topics and modes of formulation, and
they both wanted to overcome confusion and lay the foundations for future
research. In these and other respects, there are surprising similarities between
their works, and Schumpeter’s introductory statement may cover both works:
“The following account belongs to the family of purely theoretical works, and
it tries to carefully examine the foundation, the methods and the major results
of pure economics as well as its nature, value and potential.” (Wesen, 20)
The similarities between Schumpeter’s Wesen und Hauptinhalt der theoretis-
chen Nationalökonomie and Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis, how-
ever, are dwarfed by two differences. First, although both books concentrate on
mathematical economics they do so in very different ways. Schumpeter argues
that mathematics is the natural language of analytical economics but he de-
velops this argument with hardly any explicit use of mathematics. Samuelson
demonstrates the importance of mathematics by applying it. Second, the two
books have entirely different strategies of how to extend the reach of theoreti-
cal economics. Samuelson (1947, 284–5) considers dynamic analysis as implicit
in Walrasian statics and formulates a “Correspondence Principle” according to
which the “statical systems are simply degenerate special cases” of dynamical
systems. The perspective is a “comparative dynamics” that ranges to the prob-
lems of “the business cycle, and even to the majestic problems of economic
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development” (p. 355). In contrast, Schumpeter considers this type of “dy-
namics” as illegitimate because the parameters of the statical system are not
conserved over time. While a cautious form of short-term Comparative Statics
is useful, the study of longer periods must include a theory of the evolution
of parameters like production functions and consumption functions. Hence,
Wesen is not only about the ‘Foundations of Static Economic Analysis’ in the
limited sense; it also tries to demonstrate why the ‘Foundations Evolutionary
Economic Analysis’ has to be treated in an entirely different book. It will even
be proposed that Wesen demonstrates how Neoclassical Economics became the
most important among the many sources of Schumpeter’s evolutionary vision
and analysis. While other sources are treated in the next two chapters, we shall
start with the difﬁcult role of Neoclassicism.
2. Three interpretations of Wesen
The English title of Schumpeter’s Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretis-
chen Nationalökonomie would have been something like “Essence and Scope of
TheoreticalEconomics”—butthebookhasneverbeentranslatedtoEnglishlan-
guage. Wassily Leontief (1950, 105), probably, gave the best available charac-
terisation of Wesen by stating that
this remarkable book remains practically unknown in the English-speaking
world and yet it contains the statement of his fundamental views which
constitute the basis of Schumpeter’s whole scientiﬁc weltanschaung [world
view]. Some of these were never restated again as explicitly and with as
much elan. It is indicative of his turn of mind that the nearest approxima-
tion to exposition of the general principles of economics was undertaken
by Schumpeter at the very beginning of his career.
The consequence of the wide-spread ignorance of this book is not only that
the best opportunity for understanding Schumpeter has been ignored; even
mathematical economists missed an excellent account for their own work. He
was able to provide this opportunity because he was not only interested in
what could be modelled with the existing analytical techniques but also in what
was left over for novel kinds of analysis. It was his interest in the limits of
mathematical modelling that, according to Leontief (1950, 105), explained the
uniqueness and élan [vivacity] of Wesen:
The insight into the nature and appreciation of the true signiﬁcance of a
theory or a scientiﬁc procedure often ﬁnds its most sensitive measure in
a clear and unequivocal statement of its inherent limitations. While ex-
tolling the elegant precision and extraordinary hitting power of the pure,
essentially mathematical, economic theory, Schumpeter had already in this,
his ﬁrst major work [Wesen], delineated the margins of its effective range.
He speciﬁcally designated what he called the process of development as
the particular aspect which could not be encompassed by the conceptual
schemes of static general equilibrium theory.
Thus, Wesen (see Box 1 on the following page) combines issues of relevance
to mathematical economists as well as to students of “the process of develop-
ment” (economic evolution). This characteristic of the book gave it a vigour2. Three interpretations of Wesen 3
Box 1: Wesen ... der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, 1908
This book covers 626 pages and was ﬁnalised by Schumpeter in Cairo in 1908. Its
full title is Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie—in En-
glish something like “Essence and Scope of Theoretical Economics”. The book has
never been translated to English language and it was not even reprinted in German




Part II. Problems of Static Equilibrium
Part III. Theory of Distribution
Part IV. The Method of Variation
Part V. Summary of Conclusions on the Nature, Cognitive Value,
and Development Possibilities of Theoretical Economics
The Preface summarises in 18 pages the book’s background, purpose and analyt-
ical tools. Part I discusses basic methodological issues. It includes Schumpeter’s
branding of the term Methodological Individualism (pp. 88–98). Part II presents
the core of Walrasian equilibrium economics. We also meet the distinction between
Statics and Dynamics in the sense of young Schumpeter (pp. 176–186). Part III tries
to demonstrate that this core can handle wage and rent but not proﬁt and interest. It
also sketches out Schumpeter’s evolutionary theory of interest (pp. 414–430). Part
IV presents what is now called comparative statics and the related form of evolu-
tionary thinking. Part V presents Schumpeter’s conclusions and his reform pro-
gramme for economic science—the development of a narrow Modern Economics
complemented by the new ﬁeld of Evolutionary Economic Dynamics. Here it be-
comes clear that Wesen is conceived together with a second volume—which ended
up as a separate book: Entwicklung I. Links between the two books are provided
by S1910b and S1910c.
that was noted by other readers than Leontief. One of them was the Austrian-
American Oscar Morgenstern, who is known for his contribution to John von
Neumann’s development of game theory. Morgenstern (1951, 198) got a copy
of Wesen in the 1920s, and he remembered “what sort of revelation it was to me
when I ﬁrst laid hands on it and, like many others of my generation, I resolved
to read everything Schumpeter had written and would ever write.”
In contrast, Wieser’s (1911, 54) previously mentioned review of the book re-
marked that Schumpeter’s “main error is that he wants to master too much;
one gets the feeling that the author has not yet reached his equilibrium and
still has to learn to delimit himself.” Although Wieser phrased his verdict in an
urban way, its slightly ironic but precise characteristic of the youthful equilib-
rium theorist must have hid Schumpeter hard. More than thirty years later, he
emphasised his dislike of his ﬁrst book: “I have no copy and have been trying
to atone for this effort of my youth since it was issued.” (S1944a) Actually, he
wanted to produce a radically new edition and this meant that he disallowed a
German reprint and rejected proposals for a translation into English language.
As a result, only the 1000 copies of the ﬁrst edition were (until 1970) available2. Three interpretations of Wesen 4
forposterity, theonlyexceptionbeingtranslationsintoJapaneseandItalianthat
somehow avoided the Schumpeterian blockade.
The limited availability of Wesen is not sufﬁcient to explain the very lim-
ited attention to its arguments. The main explanation is that it is strange for
most economists. We may obtain a ﬁrst impression of the strangeness of its ar-
gumentative strategy by comparing it with Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by the
Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (who was born in Vienna
in 1889). Since Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is notoriously dense while Schumpe-
ter’s Wesen is very verbose, the similarity is deﬁnitely not a matter of style.
Instead, it concerns their methods of analysis, and the reason for their similar-
ities in this respect is not least that mathematicians and physicist-philosophers
inspired them both. With such inspiration, it became a major task to clean sci-
ence from metaphysics and loose talk. Wittgenstein emphasised this task as the
all-dominant purpose of Tractatus:
The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words:
what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we
must pass over in silence. ... Philosophy [i.e. the early Wittgenstein’s type
of philosophy] sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science.
... It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be
said. (Wittgenstein, 2001, Preface, §4.113, and §4.115)
This sounds like formulations of a hard-core physicist and positivist, and
the natural-science-oriented intellectuals of Vienna Circle interpreted Wittgen-
stein in this vein in the 1920s. These logical positivists were convinced that
what we can speak clearly and meaningfully about is all that matters—but
Wittgenstein did not agree. On the contrary, he believed that what we can-
not with acceptable clarity express is what really matters: “We feel that even if
all possible scientiﬁc questions have been answered, the problems of life have
still not been touched at all.” (§6.52) The precise mapping the realm of sci-
entiﬁc solutions is thus, at the same time, a mapping of the core aspects of
life—like meaning and value—that we have to handle in an intuitive manner.
In other words, he designed his Tractatus like a painter who is not interested
in the ﬁgures of his painting but rather in the negatively deﬁned background
of the ﬁgures. Furthermore, his theory of the limits of scientiﬁc modelling told
him that he could not precisely ﬁll out this all-important part of the painting.
Much later—in his Philosophical Investigations—he tried to approach the hith-
erto untouched areas. This was a natural move; but the distance of thirty years
between his two philosophical manifestos made it difﬁcult for his audience to
grasp the connection between them.
In contrast to Wittgenstein, Schumpeter was establishing himself in the
science of economics with its engagement in the problems of the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire and with its Battle of Methods between empiricists and ab-
stract theorists. There, nonetheless, are a number of similarities. Compared
with Tractatus, readers of Schumpeter’s Wesen are spared for Schopenhauerian
issues like death and the troublesome meaning of life, but instead they have
to endure his suggestions about adaptive and energetic behaviour. Neverthe-
less, we in both cases encounter an overwhelming argument for the strict ap-
plication of logic and mathematics in scientiﬁc economic—followed by short
accounts for the limits of these results with respect to the really interesting is-2. Three interpretations of Wesen 5
sues. A closer analysis demonstrates that the overall method is surprisingly
analogous to that of Wittgenstein, and this methodological congruence is even
reﬂected in Schumpeter’s formulations. Thus, Wesen, which was published ten
years before Wittgenstein ﬁnished his Tractatus, stated that
it shall always stay our principle to be silent—or ... to delimit ourselves
to summaries of facts—about things on which we have nothing exact or
sufﬁciently interesting to say. (Wesen, 618–19)
The similarity of formulation is not due to any direct contact between
SchumpeterandWittgenstein. Evenindirectrelationshipsaredifﬁculttodetect.
However, it was not too difﬁcult to develop their approaches from widespread
views in Vienna during ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century. Furthermore,
the quotation from Wesen demonstrates that their views were not identical.
The similarity is found the general imperative of being silent about things “on
which we have nothing exact ... to say”. Schumpeter, however, made two ex-
ceptions to this rule. The ﬁrst is to allow for “summaries of facts”, like the main
activity of the Historical School. The second exception is that we may deal
with things about which we can say something “sufﬁciently interesting”—even
though we cannot formulate us in an exact way. Here it is not difﬁcult to detect
that he was thinking of the effects of energetic leadership.
Given Schumpeter’s main principle of exactness and his two exceptions,
there are at least three interpretations of Wesen:
1. Promoting Modern Economics: We can read it in the mode of the Vienna
Circle by simply emphasising exactness. Then the formulation becomes a
clear-cut endorsement of a type of Neoclassical Economics that is sharp-
ened up by mathematical modelling.
2. Overcoming the Battle of Methods: The possibility of non-exact sum-
maries of facts allows us—like Max Weber—to see the book as suggesting
the co-existence of the neoclassical approach and the historical approach.
3. Preparing Evolutionary Economics: The approval of looser sayings about
sufﬁciently interesting phenomena points toward Schumpeter’s develop-
ment of evolutionary analysis beyond the limits of “exact” economics.
Although the ﬁrst two interpretations give much insight into Schumpeter’s
academic life and work, it is obviously the third interpretation that best ﬁts
the purposes of the present book. According to this interpretation, Wesen is
an—excessively long—introduction to his Entwicklung I and his later works.
It largely serves as such an introduction by putting strong emphasis on the
limited results that can be produced by following the reﬁned neoclassical pro-
gramme. Furthermore, while Wittgenstein took some thirty years to move to
the Philosophical Investigations, Schumpeter had already while writing Wesen
begun to explore the realm beyond what was, at least in his days, sayable in
an exact manner. This interpretation seems to be the one that is most faith-
fully reﬂecting the goals that directed Schumpeter’s writing of the 626 pages
of Wesen. However, two other interpretations are important for understanding
his evolutionary research programme. His ultimate goal was to bring as many3. Exploring the Magna Carta of theoretical economics 6
evolutionary phenomena as possible into the realm of the exactly sayable. Fur-
thermore, this clariﬁed theory should help the summarising of whole classes of
historical and statistical facts. Therefore, we shall try out all three interpreta-
tions.
3. Exploring the Magna Carta of theoretical economics
Since the ﬁrst interpretation concentrates on the foreground argument of We-
sen, it is relatively easy to apply. The “essence” of economic theorising is de-
ﬁned in relation to the model of the economic system by Walras and his suc-
cessor Pareto, who together formed the core of the Lausanne School. How-
ever, Schumpeter’s book presents their general equilibrium theory in verbal
terms. Therefore, German-speaking students who found themselves handi-
capped when confronted with the mathematical form, and the level of abstrac-
tion, of Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics could use Wesen instead. The book
served the same function in the US. Here Wesley Mitchell, an important institu-
tionalist economist, used it in his lectures at Columbia University in the 1920s.
Mitchell (1969, 376–7) summarised the hard-core contribution of Wesen in the
following way:
Schumpeter develops substantially just one important thesis which is the
most important result of Walras’s speculations. What he adds to Walras is
an elaborate methodological discussion of what he is going to do, the way
in which he is going to do it, the limitations of what he had done, and ﬁ-
nally the importance of the results which he set forth. ... [T]he real task
of pure economics is the task of ﬁnding how the essential results can be
demonstrated with utmost economy of intellectual means. Here again one
is reminded of a characteristic of modern mathematical work. It is consid-
ered a great advance when a known truth can be demonstrated by some
simpler method than that which has heretofore been employed.
Although Wesen argues for the great advantages of the mathematical
method for economists, it does not do so “with utmost economy of intellec-
tual means”. This is quickly recognised by comparing it with Foundations of
Economic Analysis. After four pages of introduction, Samuelson (1947, 7–20)
spends 14 pages introducing the formal characteristics of “Equilibrium Systems
and Comparative Statics” ranging from systems of a single variable to systems
“involving thousands of variables”. In contrast, Schumpeter concentrates of
the equilibrium of the Walrasian System because it covers, or can be specialised
to cover, nearly all of what has traditionally been analysed by economists. This
idea is presented on the ﬁrst 440 pages. Then follows the account for the bread-
and-butter activity of economic theorists, Comparative Statics. The explana-
tion of this verbose presentation is found in the Preface: Wesen wants to make
“the German economist” familiar with concepts, propositions, and views that
hitherto had been “foreign” (p. xxi). One of the most important reasons why
this body of knowledge and methods have not been spread is “the question of
the ‘mathematical method’”. Hence, the book will not require any signiﬁcant
level of mathematical skill. Furthermore, Wesen is “not a textbook” but rather
an introductory treatment of the “very narrow ﬁeld” within the social sciences
that “allows exact treatment” (pp. x–xi). The analysis of the real meaning of3. Exploring the Magna Carta of theoretical economics 7
the propositions of pure economics provides “something like an epistemology
of economics” (p. xii). Let us start by considering Wesen along these lines.
More speciﬁcally, let us recognise that Schumpeter’s ‘foreground argument’
concerned an equilibrium model of the economic system:
In the centre of the book stands the problem of equilibrium, the importance
of which is only slight from the viewpoint of practical applications of the-
ory, but which is nevertheless fundamental for science. In Germany, this
problem has not been given sufﬁcient consideration and it is important to
emphasise that it is at the foundation for our theoretical system. The theory
of exchange, price and money, and its most important application, the exact
theory of distribution, is based on it (Wesen, xix).
Part I is called “Foundation” and it provides a “criticism ... that is necessary
when asking about the foundations of theoretical economics” (p. 26, emphasis
removed). This criticism suggests a cleansing of the expositions of economic
theory from anything that are not essential. This cleansing is needed because
nearly all writers of economic textbooks ignored that they were presenting a
formal system that no less than Euclid’s Elements of Geometry is based on ax-
iomatic assumptions. For instance, we may think of of Marshall’s Principles of
Economics that spends the ﬁrst 270 pages motivating the basic assumptions un-
derlying the theoretical apparatus and continues to include motivating digres-
sions. Such a motivation requires intrusion into the realms of other sciences,
like psychology, in which economists are “only dilettantes” and this intrusion
provides “points of attack for the adversaries” (p. 24). Just like the science of
mechanics would never have been created if it had continued to be engaged
in explaining what “power” and “mass” really is, the science of economics
cannot be grounded in this way. Instead, economists have to acknowledge
that they presuppose a system of interdependent elements. These elements are
agents that possess given quantities of different goods; and the core question
is whether the system has an unambiguous state of equilibrium. The task of
theoretical economics is to explain this equilibrium and its inﬁnitesimal change
without relying on other sciences. The totality of the propositions that can be
derived in this way deﬁnes the discipline of theoretical economics (pp. 28–9).
The speciﬁcation of what John Stuart Mill had called “the laws of coordi-
nation” starts with chapters on “The Exchange Relation”. At a given point of
time, each good is assumed to be bought or sold at a given price. Hence a unit
of this good can be exchanged with ﬁxed quantities of all other goods. The
investigation of these relationships is the subject matter of all pure economic
theory (p. 53). This theory can be constructed in several ways that cannot
be judged from their truth but only from their usefulness. For instance, the
labour theory of value of Classical Economics should not be considered as false
but as unfruitful for the treatment of important economic problems (pp. 57–
63). In contrast, the solution to the problem of economic interdependence is
directly served by focussing on marginal evaluations performed by each eco-
nomic agent (pp. 71, 105–7). Since these evaluations are reﬂected in observable
behaviour, the “value principle” does not need the psychological reﬂections of
many Neoclassical Economists.
Part II deals extensively with “The Problem of Static Equilibrium”. Since
any difference in the evaluations of the marginal contributions to an agent’s3. Exploring the Magna Carta of theoretical economics 8
utility would contradict equilibrium, they have to be equalised according to
the “law of the level of marginal utility” (pp. 129–31). We may also say that
the relationship between the marginal utilities of any two goods have to be
equal to the reverse relationship between their prices (p. 213). This rule, the
“alpha and omega” of pure economics, can also be used for the analysis of
the problems of production. This becomes clear when we study a competi-
tive economy in which equilibrium prices have to reﬂect marginal costs. Here
the equilibrium condition is that the marginal costs of a good is equal to its
marginal utility (pp. 214–15). Like Walras, Schumpeter recognises that this
simply means that productive services are included among the elements of the
economic system. Since this solution did not satisfy the consumption-oriented
members of the Austrian School, he tries to demonstrate that supply curves can
be reinterpreted as an alternative form of demand curves (p. 235). He, never-
theless, focusses on the Walrasian theory of price: the deﬁnition of a system
of equations that simultaneously determines all quantities and all prices (pp.
260–2). He presents the necessary condition for the uniqueness of the solution
by counting equations and he emphasises the missing equation for the price of
the money good. He also presents the limitations of the solution by rehears-
ing the poor state of price theory with respect to “limited competition” and by
remarking that perfect competition is at best an approximation to reality (pp.
269–72). This approximation, however, is good enough for many purposes. It
not least clariﬁes the theory of money to a surprising degree (pp. 276–7) while
the theory of saving seems to be in a poor state (pp. 304–5).
Part III handles the “Theory of Distribution”. This is not only “the most
important application of price theory” but also a tool for unwarranted answers
to highly controversial socio-economic problems (pp. 315–16). Economists had
normally tried to explain (and justify) the incomes derived from labour, land,
and physical capital. In addition to wage, rent, and interest on capital, some
economists had added entrepreneurial proﬁt is a fourth basic category of in-
come. Wesen points out that much of the confusion on these matters is due
to the study of the factors of production instead of their productive services.
Given this “artiﬁce” (p. 372), the size of wages and rents can easily be deter-
mined by including the services of labour and land as elements of the system of
economic equations (pp. 330–1, 368). In contrast, entrepreneurial proﬁts cannot
be treated in this system because they are expressions of disequilibrium. The
concrete explanation of interest on capital was a more controversial matter but
practically everyone agreed that it should be included as a source of income
in an equilibrated economic system (p. 392). Schumpeter disagrees. He also
argues that when compared with Classical Economics, his truncated theory of
distribution is a major advance because it explains wage and rent in exactly the
same way and because it is a more powerful analytical tool (p. 379).
Part IV moves from what John Stuart Mill had called “the laws of coordi-
nation” to what Schumpeter, together with Mill, call “the laws of motion” (p.
443). This part of the book has the heading of “The Method of Variation”. This
method starts from an equilibrium state of the economic system and compares
it with the new equilibrium that is caused by a change in one of the elements
of the system (a quantity or a price of a good or service). The core issue is the
changes, or “variations”, of the endogenous variables. Thus, we are dealing3. Exploring the Magna Carta of theoretical economics 9
with what we today, with a phrase that was coined by Oppenheimer (History,
855, 965), call Comparative Statics. Actually, Schumpeter seems to be the ﬁrst to
describe this method systematically—and he does so with utmost care. While
the theory of distribution solves one core problem, Comparative Statics another
core problem and provides “the second group of results of exact economics”
(Wesen, 443). Furthermore, the method is heavily used by all economists and
it is even underlying the do-it-yourself economics of “politicians” and “histori-
ans” (pp. 475–6). The problem with all these applications is that the method is
used without sufﬁcient consideration of the underlying methodological prob-
lems.
As anyone who has performed physical experiments in high school ought
to know, Comparative Statics presupposes that we have a well-deﬁned system
and only change one thing at a time. If we take a “snapshot” (Wesen, 142) of an
equilibrium state and change one element of the system, then we would like to
know in advance what the snapshot in the resultant equilibrium looks like. To
make this prediction, we need to take something as given; and in the present
case this something is the consumption functions and the production functions
of the economic agents. These functions serves to determine the response of
economic agents to, for instance, a change in price. A widespread use of this
method had developed without a careful study of the underlying problems.
The resulting controversies can be avoided by acknowledging the nature of the
system of economic equations (pp. 456–75). Since the given functional rela-
tions between the elements of the model describe individual reactions to small
and continuous change, these functions cannot be used for the analysis the re-
sponse of the economic system to major or discrete changes of its elements.
Comparisons between equilibria that are separated by long time periods are
also problematic since they draw attention away from the major changes of the
functional relationship that are likely to occur during such periods. Therefore,
the method of variation is, in general, only applicable in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of an equilibrium of the given economic system, measured in in time
and in the state space of the system. This limitation and the possibilities of
overcoming it are illustrated by 40 pages of examples on taxes, import duties,
changes of income, and the introduction of machinery (pp. 478–519).
Part V has the long title “Summary of Conclusions on the Essence, Cogni-
tive Value, and Development Possibilities of Theoretical Economics”. This long
heading precedes one hundred pages of conclusions! Nevertheless, the conclu-
sions are simple with respect to the above argument. First, the demarcation of
the domain of theory-based economics should be deﬁned by the set of prob-
lems for which its basic model and the underlying “schema of exchange” can
be applied (p. 582). Second, the “methodological and epistemological essence”
of pure economics demonstrates that it is “a ‘natural science’ and its theorems
are ‘natural laws’” (p. 536). Third, this science is best served by sticking to
its place in the scientiﬁc division of labour. Although economic research and
the writing of economic textbooks might reﬂect inspiration from the tools of
the natural sciences and the contents of other social sciences, they should be
cleansed from the frequent intrusions into the domains of other sciences (pp.
536–53). These three conclusions provide a surprisingly accurate description of
much of the later development of Modern Economics. They suggest that theo-4. Resolving the Battle of Methods 10
reticaleconomics, especiallythroughitsWalrasianformulation, formsa“closed
and autonomous province within the realm of knowledge” (p. 523). As Schum-
peter later said (History, 242, 827), Walras had created the “Magna Carta” of
this province—both as the ﬁrst complete map and as the original constitutional
document—and this made him “the greatest of all economists”. Even for those
unfamiliar with the development of the English constitutional law based on the
Magna Carta of the year 1215, the meaning of the underlying caveat should be
clear: Walras, of course, was not perfect. Nevertheless, he had demonstrated
that the “subject matter” of economic theory “is a cosmos and not a chaos”
(Cycles, 41) and he had implicitly determined the borderlines of this theory.
This is the main outcome of Wesen as long as we concentrate on its foreground
argument.
4. Resolving the Battle of Methods
The second interpretation of Wesen is that it wants to create room for re-
searchers engaged in non-exact summaries of facts. Since this is largely how the
early Schumpeter characterised the activities of the German Historical School,
his ﬁrst book can be seen as promoting a resolution of the Battle of Methods be-
tweenthatschoolandtheAustrianSchoolor, morespeciﬁcally, betweenGustav
von Schmoller and Carl Menger (see Box 2 on the next page). This reading is
helped by recognising that the book is addressed to a German audience that
was dominated by Max Weber and other “historians” who worked according
to the “the Schmoller programme” (S1926a, 186). The foreground argument
about the narrow domain reserved for pure theory leaves plenty of room for
alternative modes of study—and this point is explicitly made. The ﬁrst signal
is found on the ﬁrst pages of the Preface. Here we meet a programme of rec-
onciliation: “nearly every ‘school’ [‘Richtung’] and every individual author are
right in their propositions ... from the standpoint of the purposes for which
they are intended”. Therefore, the task is “learn, not criticise; analyse and work
out the correct in each proposition, not merely accept of reject” (Wesen, v–vi;
emphasis removed). Although these statements are general, they as especially
intended to cover controversies within theoretical economics as well as the Bat-
tle of Methods. However, Schumpeter immediately adds that he considers the
controversy “between pure theory and history to be largely overcome” and that
he for each scientiﬁc problem will “investigate whether the one or the other
treatment is most recommendable” (p. vii). In contrast, the “whole history of
the battle of methods” can be described the sentence: “Everyone is convinced
of his exclusive rights while he only partially can demonstrate this, and the be-
ginner does not know which to adhere to” (p. xvi).
Part I continues this story. The Battle of Methods is hardly surprising since
even natural sciences like chemistry and mechanics are characterised by contro-
versies between experimentalists and theorists as well as in the camp of pure
theory (pp. 4–6). The main reason is that each researcher has to specialise, that
this specialisation becomes part of his personality, and that he hardly recog-
nise the borderlines of his speciality. The same situation is found in the science
of economics although price theory is beyond the reach of the empirically ori-4. Resolving the Battle of Methods 11
Box 2: The slogans and labels of the Battle of Methods
The German–Austrian Battle of Methods (Methodenstreit) was a controversy on the
scientiﬁc and practical value of, on the one hand, abstract economic theorising
and, on the other hand, empirical-historical research. The debate took place within
a broadly deﬁned economics that studied both the economic system and related
socio-political areas. It started as a criticism of Classical Economics by German
historically minded economists (the Historical School). However, a more focussed
debate emerged after the founder of the small Austrian School (Menger) attacked
the leader of the predominant Historical School (Schmoller) in 1883–84. This de-
bate became an important determinant for the development of economics in the
German-speaking countries until the 1920s. However, the Battle of Methods largely
degenerated into a discussion based on a set of labels or slogans that came to be
attached to each school. These imprecise characterisations are summarised in the
following table.
Historical School Classical and Austrian Schools




Organistic, collectivistic Atomistic, individualistic
Sociologically oriented Non-sociological, ‘economic man’
Protective tariffs Free trade
State intervention and reform Laissez-faire (with modiﬁcations)
Schumpeter’s accounts for the Battle of Methods are spread over several works.
His major statements are found in Doctrine (152–4) and History (814–15). From
these accounts, it is obvious that he largely considered the controversy as being a
waste of time—but it, nevertheless, inﬂuenced his own teaching and research pro-
gramme. It is also clear that he ignored the aspect of the controversy that related
to opposing economic policies. This approach reﬂected his stand in the related
Battle of Value Judgements (Werturteilsstreit): by removing value judgements and
economic policy from scientiﬁc economics, only the unavoidable conﬂict between
empiricists and theorists would remain.
ented researchers while the problem of the overall organisation of the social
economy cannot be treated by abstract theorists (p. 7). This problem was over-
looked because the Historical School started by attacking Classical Economics
at a time when it had entered a period of deep stagnation that even crippled the
creativity of the great Stuart Mill (pp. 9–10). Hence it is understandable that the
Historical School chose to throw abstract theory overboard and concentrate on
facts and practical problems. However, the members of this school never un-
derstood the nature of the theorising of the emerging Neoclassical Economics.
Instead, they started “the development of new theories on the basis historical
materials” of which the “most well known example of this is probably the ‘The-
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All information indicates that this group [Richtung] is in a quick upswing
and soon will dispose of a signiﬁcant literature. However, it ... does not
build an abstract system, but makes individual hypotheses on concrete
questions ... [These hypotheses] ... strive for no generality but relate al-
ways to deﬁnite historical facts. ... They have also a similarity with the
hypotheses of biology, which is strengthened by their dealing mostly with
the problems of evolution [Entwicklung]. They are everything else than
‘static’, ... [b]ut perhaps the area of ‘Dynamics’ belongs to them! That will
have to be seen.
These formulations demonstrate that Schumpeter did not dismiss history-
friendly theorising. Actually, he simply considered the “descriptive” and the
theoretical method as to ways of handling facts that both have inductive and
deductive elements. In this respect, there is no difference. The only difference
is that the theorist tries to cover whole classes of fact by developing a formal
model that is characterised by the utmost economy of thought (p. 41–4). This
level of formality and simplicity is only applicable to few areas of social life.
Furthermore, the overselling of the descriptive accuracy of abstract theory was
quickly recognised by empirically oriented researchers and contributed to the
Battle of Methods (p. 48). The apparent founding of Neoclassical Economics
in a broadly conceived atomism and individualism was also highly provok-
ing for researchers who emphasised altruism and collectivism (p. 82). The
problem is that many economic treaties start with a speciﬁcation of Homo Eco-
nomicus or other theoretical versions of Homo sapiens. This is, however, not the
strategy of Walras and Schumpeter (Wesen, 85–7). As theoretical economists,
we should not consider economic agents—households and ﬁrms—from their
inside through psychology (as Wieser wanted) or from the viewpoint of or-
ganisation theory (as members of the Historical School did). In contrast, agents
should be studied from outside, from what we as researchers can observe about
their behaviour. This is all we need if we take serious that we are dealing with
the properties of a system of quantities of goods and exchange relations be-
tween them (prices). The theoretical agents are designed to ﬁt the model of this
system. To emphasise this point, Schumpeter coined the phrase “methodolog-
ical individualism” and dedicated a whole chapter for clarifying the issue (pp.
87–98).
Parts II–IV can be browsed quickly since we know their main contents from
the above account. With respect to the Battle of Methods, we simply need
to note that Schumpeter, at each major step of his argument, emphasises the
limited scope of theoretical economics and thus the room for alternative treat-
ments. Forinstance, theoreticalmake“formalassumptions”whileothersmight
make“theoriesonthecausesofeconomicaction”(p. 129). Thesetheoriesmight
concern the interdependent inﬂuences of “[r]ace, cultural level, social position,
education, personality” well as those of “the natural environment and social
organisation” (p. 142). In contrast, the theorist only needs assumptions on the
preferences that determine short-term choice in the economic system. Further-
more, production technology and industrial organisation are also represented
by parameters by the theorist while they are problems for the studies of the
Historical School (p. 148). The fact that Marshall treated these topics exten-
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model of the economic system (p. 150). Similarly, the basic model fails to sup-
port an extension of economic theorising into the long run and thus to to great
phenomena of economic evolution (pp. 177, 186). The impression of a limited
contribution of theoretical economics and the need for a complementary effort
by the Historical School becomes stronger and stronger. It also covers money
and ﬁnance (p. 297), saving behaviour (p. 308), and long-term issues of rent on
land (pp. 375–6).
Part V’s narrow programme for theoretical economics obviously leaves a
very large domain for the Historical School. Actually, the members of this
school had already occupied much of this domain while they considered the
domain of theoretical economics of very little interest. Therefore, they could
hardly oppose Schumpeter’s conclusion. This conclusion was that the Wal-
rasian Magna Carta allowed him to “preach a kind of Monroe Doctrine of eco-
nomics” (Wesen, 536), that is, a dual principle of foreign policy: no acceptance
of intervention from foreigners, no attempt to intervene against outsiders. If
this doctrine was accepted, the transgressions of the Battle of Methods were
overcome. Theoretical economists could concentrate on developing and apply-
ing their analytical tools within safe borderlines. At the same time, these bor-
ders deﬁned the domains in which the Historical School should not fear any
attack from the theorists.
Schumpeter’s argument for staying within the borderlines of economic
analysis is largely related to advantages of a strict division of labour within
science. For instance, his argument implies that much of what is included in
the introductory parts of Marshall’s Principles should be left out and taken over
by the emerging ﬁeld of Economic Sociology. This purging of economic the-
ory had largely been completed by Walras, and the main task for theoretical
economists is to complete his work on Economic Statics. For that purpose, dy-
namical extensions of the Walrasian System only create confusion. This ex-
plains Schumpeter’s later rejection of the model of Dynamic General Equilib-
rium by the Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, which was developed before
and published immediately after World War I. Cassel tried to demonstrate that
the elements of the Walrasian System could grow in a uniform manner, and
therebyhebecamea pioneerofthemoderntheoryof economic growth. Schum-
peter, however, considered the study of growth without structural change as an
example of the misleading artefacts that emerged when the proper boundaries
of Economic Statics were transgressed: “by replacing the absence of change by
‘balanced’ or ‘equilibrated progress’, we arrive at a picture which really de-
serves to be called the more unrealistic, the more it presents the misleading
appearance of lifelikeness.” (Cycles, 37) Thus, theoretical economists seems to
be trapped within their static model; and Wesen can be read as an acceptance
of this situation. What is left is simply problems of scientiﬁc coordination. For
instance, the division of labour creates a problem for those theorists interested
in the empirical veriﬁcation of their theorems that are of no immediate interest
for empirically oriented researchers (p. 532). Another need felt by some theo-
rists is the collaboration with sociologists, of which many had connections to
the Historical School. Although sociology has nothing to do with economics in
a methodological and epistemological sense, the “development of sociology ...
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inant inclinations, the members of the Historical School would provide these
services.
5. The Statics–Dynamics dichotomy
The third interpretation of Wesen concerns the, largely evolutionary, phenom-
ena that were at the centre of the attention of most economists although they
are covered by the Walrasian Magna Carta. The general opinion was that these
phenomena would soon be subsumed under Neoclassical Economics by its
gradual extension towards long-term issues. Underlying this opinion was the
fact that this type of economic analysis had, in the beginning of the twentieth
century, matured to a degree that was hardly recognised in Austria and Ger-
many. This maturation suggested that economics were turning into a science in
a way that Classical Economics had not achieved; and the results were impres-
sive. However, as Schumpeter later emphasised, this maturation meant that
economics had entered
a classical situation in our sense, the leading works of which exhibited a
large expanse of common ground and suggest a feeling of repose, both of
which created, in the superﬁcial observer, an impression of ﬁnality—the
ﬁnality of a Greek temple that spreads its perfect lines against a cloudless
sky. But in the last decade or so before the outbreak of the First World
War, even the superﬁcial observer should have been able to discern signs
of decay, of new breaks in the ofﬁng, of revolutions that had not yet issued
into another classical situation. (History, 754)
Schumpeter was no superﬁcial observer, so he immediately focussed on the
problem that the beautiful architecture of the theoretical constructs of the lead-
ing neoclassical economists had been obtained at serious costs. It excluded
a serious treatment of that long-term change in the economic framework that
arises from the innovative competition among ﬁrms as well as related phenom-
ena like entrepreneurial proﬁt, credit and business cycles. Thus, there was a
need of complementing the theory of an equilibrating economic system with a
theory of the processes that change the economic system. This need is obvious
if we accept not only Wesen’s positive deﬁnition of the domain of theoretical
economics but also the deﬁnition of what is not included in that domain. In the
Preface to Wesen (p. xix), he emphasised that his
exposition depends on the fundamental separation between economic
‘Statics’ and ‘Dynamics’, a point whose importance cannot be overstated.
For the time being, the methods of pure economics are only sufﬁcient for
the former area, and our results hold only for this area. ‘Dynamics’ is some-
thing that in any respect is completely different from ‘Statics’, methodolog-
ically as well as regarding contents. ... We shall see ... that it [the separa-
tion] holds the key to the solution of many controversies and many appar-
ent contradictions ...
From Schumpeter’s perspective, Statics could be deﬁned as the combina-
tion of equilibrium analysis and the core phenomena covered by that method.
His deﬁnition of Dynamics is less clear—mainly because it is “a land of the fu-
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“Entwicklung” (‘development’ or ‘evolution’) that can be handled theoretically
combined with the method that will be developed for the analysis of these phe-
nomena. This version of the Statics–Dynamics dichotomy was crucial for the
arguments in Wesen and Entwicklung I, but he largely applied the terms in
quotation marks and he pointed out that he kept the terminology “for reasons
of convenience” although he considered it “very unfortunate” (Wesen, 182).
It is obviously not taken from mechanical physics in which ‘dynamics’ is the
method of analysing the deterministic movement of systems of bodies (like the
Solar System). In contrast, Stuart Mill’s System of Logic distinguished between
Statics as the study of the conditions of stability and Dynamics as the study of
the laws of progress. Through the philosopher Auguste Comte these concepts
points back to a biological analogy (Development, xi).
A much more obvious source of Schumpeter’s dichotomy, however, is the
work of the leading American economist John Bates Clark. Clark had been
involved in a lengthy and famous controversy with Böhm-Bawerk on the con-
cept of capital. This controversy caught Schumpeter’s attention, and he even,
in 1907, translated one of Clark’s contributions for the scientiﬁc journal of the
Austrian economists. As a side effect, Schumpeter must have recognised that
Clark’s work helped him to overcome the exclusion of a real analysis of eco-
nomic evolution from Neoclassical Economics. Clark (1898; 1899) suggested
his strategy in his 1898 paper on “The Future of Economic Theory” as well as in
his large book on The Distribution of Wealth from 1899. Here it became clear that
althoughClackhaddevelopedhisowncontributiontoNeoclassicalEconomics,
he had also tried to clarify how a movement towards the study of “Economic
Dynamics” could take place. Like neoclassical economists in general, Clark had
analysed a stylised and stationary economy. His particular contribution was to
determine the distribution of income by means of the marginal contribution to
production of the different types of agent. He was, however, aware that his
elegant analysis did not provide an explanation for the major determinants of
income distribution in the real world. Furthermore, Neoclassical Economics
was becoming less productive as it moved into modelling detail. In the per-
spective of research for the coming century, Clark (1898, 14) argued that it was
high time to move to “the science of Social Economic Dynamics”. Schumpeter
fully accepted the need for moving forward to Economic Dynamics, but he also
appreciated Clark’s conviction that the starting point was the well-established
area of “Economic Statics”. Thus, Clark’s Statics–Dynamics dichotomy became
a crucial tool for the development of the core arguments in Wesen and Ent-
wicklung I. More speciﬁcally, Schumpeter seems to have wanted to deﬁne two
relatively independent areas of theoretical economics according to the formula:
Theoretical Economics = Statics+ Dynamics
Statics ≈ Neoclassical Economics
Dynamics ≈ Evolutionary Economics
Although Clark did not share Schumpeter’s interpretation of Dynamics as
what may be called Evolutionary Economics, the background of the formula in
Clark’s work is not difﬁcult to detect. Even in the Preface to his Distribution of
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Schumpeter. These formulations cover both the non-evolving neoclassical sys-
tem and the transcendence of this system. Clark characterises the former sys-
tem as “static”, that is, as covering a stationary state. Neoclassical Economics
builds on the implicit assumption of this state, and it is even hidden in the
concept of “natural” prices of the factors of production used by Classical Eco-
nomics:
The term natural, as used by classical economists in connection with stan-
dards of value, wages and interest, was unconsciously employed as an
equivalent of the term static; and it is such natural or static standards that
this volume undertakes to present. It aims to show what rates the market
prices of goods, the wages of labor and the interest on capital would con-
form, if the changes that are going on in the shape of the industrial world
and in the character of its activities were to cease. It tries completely to iso-
late the static forces that act in distribution from the dynamic forces. (Clark,
1899, vi)
Fromsuchformulations, Schumpeterreceivedaﬁrstspeciﬁcationofthelim-
itation of the analysis provided by theoretical economists. Classical Economics
had hidden this limitation by verbal accounts for economic progress, but the
formal approach of Neoclassical Economics served to clarify the problem: it
makes its analysis of the effects of “static forces” under the assumption that
the “forces of progress” have become “paralyzed” (Clark, 1899, vi–vii). Since
change and evolution underlie many of the most conspicuous phenomena of
the capitalist economy, this problem is a serious one. The task for the new cen-
tury, therefore, was to remove the paralysing assumption. According to Clark,
this opens up the area of Economic Dynamics—the study of economic growth
and evolution:
It is already clear that the ﬁeld for new investigation offered by economic
dynamics is an indeﬁnitely fruitful one. It ... [deals with] essentially new
problems, because the prevailing mode of economic study has not hereto-
fore isolated then, brought them clearly into view and afforded the data for
solving them. ... The mere theory of economic dynamics will enlarge by
many fold the scope of political economy; it will lift theory to a new plane.
The statement of the pure laws of economic change will open, as it were,
the vestibule of the science of the future. (pp. 35, 76)
Clarkdidnotenterthis“vestibule”inhisDistributionofWealth—hereserved
this entering for a later work—but he gave a few indications about its character-
istics. In terms of the “standards” of economic life, the task was to analyse both
the forces that establishes ﬁxed standards and the forces that create new stan-
dards. In Clark’s (p. 32) terms, this meant the introduction of both “static” and
“dynamic” forces: “Static forces set the standards, and dynamic forces produce
the variations.” The complete process of economic evolution covers both the
disturbance of the economic standards and their re-establishment. The strate-
gic problem was how to specify the “dynamic forces”. Clark did not say much
about this problem, and he seems primarily to have thought of forces inﬂuenc-
ing the economic system from the outside. However, he made remarks that
pointed in another direction. Although they are not central to Clark’s own ar-
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The prices that conform to the cost of production are, of course, those which
give no clear proﬁt to the entrepreneur. ... [A]n invention ﬁrst gives a proﬁt
to entrepreneurs and then, in the way that we have described, adds some-
thing to wages and interest. ... Dynamic science deals with proﬁts in their
original state, as normally created by improvements in industry, in the pro-
ceeds of which the entrepreneurs have a share; while static science deals with
them in their later and permanent state, as they are transmuted into incre-
ments of wages and interest. (pp. 70, 405, 410)
In these remarks about innovative renewal and its potential transformation
into the standards of reformed stationary state, the entrepreneur is obviously at
the very centre of the stage. Here we have a glimpse of grand vision that caught
Schumpeter’s attention and, in modiﬁed form, inﬂuenced him for the rest of
his life. Based on Clark’s hints, he must have waited eagerly for the “dynamic”
sequel to Distribution of Wealth—which Clark even suggested had some rela-
tionship to Böhm-Bawerk’s work. This second volume came out in 1907, and
it was a disappointment because of Clark’s emphasis on simple growth and
automatic progress. In his review, Schumpeter (S1908b, 655) especially missed
the “energetic aspects” that is a major “lever of economic evolution”. This made
him realise that he had to make his own advance towards a type of Economic
Dynamics that emphasised the innovative activities of the entrepreneur: “in him
lies the most essential difference between the dynamic viewpoint opposite to
the Statics that presuppose hedonic equilibrium men” (S1908b, 655). In Wesen
(p. 182–3), however, he started by stating the problem more generally:
Statics and Dynamics are completely different ﬁelds, they concern not only
different problems but also different methods and different materials. They
are not two chapters of one and the same theoretical building but two com-
pletely independent buildings. Only Statics has hitherto been somewhat
satisfactorily worked up and we essentially only deal with it in this book.
Dynamics is still in its beginnings, is a ‘land of the future’.
This formulation is indirectly pointing at an independent treatise of Eco-
nomic Dynamics. This promise is made more explicit elsewhere in Wesen.
Thus, Schumpeter remarks that he in relation of how fortunes are created have
found “new elements for ... a kind of theory of economic development” [The-
orie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung] that he cannot include but that he, per-
haps, “later” can present to the public (pp. 309–10). Furthermore, he points
out that it is not only the explanation of interest, entrepreneurial proﬁt, and the
formation of fortunes that have to rely on the development of Dynamics. This
ﬁeld also have to cover “the problems ... of the economic progress and crises”
(p. 587). Even with respect to the value of land, he ﬁnds “a seed for a new
theory” (p. 588n). Finally, he presents an entrepreneur-based theory of interest
on capital in a section called “Prolegomena to a Dynamic Theory of Interest”
(pp. 414–30). Obviously, such ‘introductory remarks’ have to be followed by a
more extensive treatment. Although this treatment in found in Entwicklung I,
the development of core aspects of Economic Dynamics are present in Wesen.
However, although these aspects were “interesting”, it was still an open ques-
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6. Types of entrepreneurs and
parameters of the economic system
Schumpeter’s attempts to develop an “exact” theory about economic evolution
probably started from the Walrasian System. Many years after he wrote his We-
sen, he emphasised his immediate recognition of the limitations of this system
due to its focus on Economic Statics. In the Preface to the Japanese edition of
Development he stated that he discovered that Walras’s focus was not made
for purely methodological reasons. On the contrary,
Walras would have ... said (and, as a matter of fact, he did say it to me the
only time that I had the opportunity to converse with him) that of course
economic life is essentially passive and merely adapts itself to the natu-
ral and social inﬂuences which may be acting on it, so that the theory of
a stationary process constitutes really the whole of theoretical economics
and that as economic theorists we cannot say much about the factors that
account for historical change, but must simply register them. (S1937a, 166)
Walras’s conception of a passively adapting economy provoked Schumpe-
ter’s critical response that was based on his elitist vision of economic change:
I [Schumpeter] felt very strongly that this was wrong, and that there was a
source of energy within the economic system which would of itself disrupt
any equilibrium that might be attained. (p. 166)
His vision of this disruptive force determined his analytical efforts. He felt
conﬁdent that
there must be a purely economic theory of economic change which does
not merely rely on external factors propelling the economic system from
one equilibrium to another. It is such a theory that I have tried to build
and I believe now, as I believed then, that it contributes something to the
understanding of the struggles and vicissitudes of the capitalist world and
explains a number of phenomena, in particular the business cycle, more sat-
isfactory than it is possible to explain them by means of either the Walrasian
or the Marshallian apparatus. (p. 166)
Thus, Schumpeter developed his version of Economic Dynamics in opposi-
tion to Walras (and Marshall). However, there is little doubt that his reading
of Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics directly inﬂuenced his evolutionary the-
ory. Since this inﬂuence is difﬁcult to detect in Wesen, we shall start the study
of this issue by the account for the emerging Economic Dynamics that we ﬁnd
in Schumpeter’s “prolegomena”. The starting point is the theory of interest
on capital developed by Böhm-Bawerk. Even Carl Menger had stated: “‘The
time will come when people will realize that Böhm-Bawerk’s theory is one of
the greatest errors ever committed.’” (History, 847n). In contrast, Schumpe-
ter tried to rescue parts of the Böhm-Bawerkian theory by emphasising that
is was a contribution to “dynamics” rather than to “statics” (Wesen, 428, 408–
13). However, his own theory of interest started from the viewpoint of the en-
trepreneur who created radically new lines of production in a given economic
system. Although the presentation of his alternative theory logically should
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sketch in Wesen (414–30). Here he suggested that his theory might partly be ex-
pressed in terms of Böhm-Bawerk’s concept of the productivity of roundabout
methods of production. The main point is that the use of roundabout methods
does not generally and permanently create an ability to pay a premium to the
capitalist savers. Instead, it is the investment of entrepreneurs in innovations
with higher productivities that provides the proﬁt that can be used to pay inter-
est. They do so by solving an inter-temporal problem. The presently available
“world of goods” is governed by a system of prices that has no room for the
innovative project. However, if some of these goods are brought into a “new
combination”, then they can be used to produce a future output that can pay a
premium when measured in terms of the present price system. The condition
is that—although the present has no room for it—credit money is created for
the innovative project. With these money the entrepreneur detracts some of the
present goods for his innovative purpose. His demand for “purchasing power”
(p. 427) essentially explains the phenomenon of interest.
Given his emerging vision of Economic Dynamics, it is not difﬁcult to detect
how Schumpeter developed his criticism of the sketches of a dynamical process
that are found in Walras’s Elements. The driver of this sketchy dynamics of
the economic system is an agent that is presently best denoted the Walrasian
entrepreneur, or the W-entrepreneur. This W-entrepreneur has a paradoxical
role in Walras’s essentially static system. On the one hand, the W-entrepreneurs
bring the elements of the system together into a coherent whole through an
equilibrating process that is motivated by proﬁt opportunities. On the other
hand, the holders of the role of W-entrepreneurship have no income when the
system has moved to equilibrium. These two characteristics of the Walrasian
System become clear as soon as we consider its basic structure. Walras (1954,
222) deﬁned a role list that contains four essential types of player:
Let us call the holder of land ... a land-owner, the holder of personal fac-
ulties a worker and the holder of capital proper a capitalist. In addition, let
us designate by the term entrepreneur a fourth person, entirely distinct from
thosejustmentioned, whoseroleitistoleaselandfromtheland-owner, hire
personal faculties from the labourer, and borrow capital from the capitalist,
in order to combine the three productive services in agriculture, industry
or trade.
From these role descriptions of the Dramatis Personae, it is obvious that the
W-entrepreneurs are at the centre of Walras’s model world: Their function is to
combine the elements and thereby create an integrated economic system. The
individual W-entrepreneur hires the necessary factors of production at given
conditions of payment, and he initiates a process of production in which one of
the employed workers function as a manager. When the goods have been pro-
duced, he sells them at the market price that is prevailing at that time. Then the
W-entrepreneur makes up his balance sheet. Depending on the costs of the fac-
tors of production and the price of the goods, his bottom line shows either gain
or loss. Such positive or negative proﬁts, however, only exist as long as the eco-
nomic system is in disequilibrium. According to Walras, this disequilibrium
is removed by perfect competition among W-entrepreneurs. When this com-
petition has brought the system into equilibrium through a process of trial and
error (tâtonnement), the W-entrepreneurs “make neither gain nor loss” (Wesen,6. Types of entrepreneurs and parameters of the economic system 20
438).
Walras’s equilibrium thus has an apparently paradoxical characteristic: his
W-entrepreneurs that are driven by the proﬁt motive obtain no proﬁt whatso-
ever. Hence he must conclude that in equilibrium the W-entrepreneurs model
have to obtain their incomes by functioning as landowners, workers, or cap-
italists. Schumpeter thought “that this entrepreneur is only a ﬁction” that is
created because of the limitations of Economic Statics (Wesen, 438). However,
he also recognised the possibilities of inserting an alternative entrepreneur, the
S-entrepreneur, into a reinterpreted version of the Walrasian System. The back-
ground was that he thought that Walras’s account for the tâtonnement process
gives a false picture of the speed of the market process. While Walras saw the
groping toward equilibrium as a speedy process without disequilibrium trad-
ing, Schumpeter followed the Austrian School by considering it very slow and
erroneous. It has thus, somewhat provocatively, been remarked that “Walras’s
tâtonnement takes a minute; Menger’s tâtonnement takes a century!” (Streissler,
1973, 174; emphasis removed). Carl Menger’s Austrian successors, and espe-
cially Friedrich von Wieser, developed his view on the slow process of “imput-
ing” values to intermediate goods and primary production factors, based on
the valuations of consumer’s goods. It probably is not least the sluggishness
of Wieser’s tâtonnement process that Schumpeter refers to when he states that
“that L. Walras and v. Wieser are those authors whom the author [Schumpe-
ter] believes he is closest to” (Wesen, ix). This process is described in Wieser’s
(1971, 212–13) Natural Value:
A knowledge of the values of goods, such as has existed in every economy
up till now, is ..., in itself, one of the most valuable of possessions. It is
almost as valuable as the possession of the goods themselves, inasmuch as
it is the key to their use. The sum of thousands of years of experience con-
cerning the sources of supply of goods, and the suitability or otherwise of
the conditions of their production, as well as concerning the amount of de-
mand for them, is represented in the ﬁgures of value handed down to us.
Were a nation to lose all remembrance of these, it would be an enormous
economic misfortune. An almost incalculable period of time, an almost in-
calculable amount of error and loss, would have to be gone through, before
the nation could again obtain mastery over the relations of goods formerly
expressed, with numerical clearness, for each individual good by means of
value.
Schumpeter’s interpretation of the Austrian tâtonnement seems to have been
that the living conditions of a nation is translated for the routinised choice of
agents with bounded rationality through the slow emergence of a consistent
price system. Based on the Statics–Dynamics dichotomy, he saw this as a speci-
ﬁcation to the “ﬁrst problem of economics”, that is, to ﬁnd the equilibrium state
of the economic system from given parameters. The second great problem of
economics, however, was not treated. It concerns the development of a “the-
ory of the change of data [parameters]” (Entwicklung I, 464–5). The problem
of this theory is how “an economy accomplish the transition from one level ...
to another level” (p. 466). As already mentioned, Schumpeter recognised this
problem “when in my beginnings I studied the Walrasian conception and the
Walrasian technique” (S1937a, 165). Although he “as an economist owed more
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model” that answered “the question how the economic system generates the
force which incessantly transforms it” (p. 165). The birthplace of Schumpeter’s
model, probably, can be found in his account for Walrasian Comparative Statics
(Wesen, 441–519).
Schumpeter’s name for Comparative Statics is “the method of variation”,
that is, the study of the response of the endogenous variables to an exogenous
change. He emphasises that this study of the variation of the endogenous vari-
ables presupposes that the production functions and consumption functions
of the economic system do not change. This means that the response to the
exogenous change has to be small and take place quickly. An example of the
problems created by a major change is described in terms of the marginal value
of money (Wesen, 471–4). Since the evaluation of money is the outcome of
long experience, a major change means that the economic agents have to restart
their “‘learning to count’” (p. 473). This learning is hindered by the fact that
the value of money is closely related to the “standard of life” required to be
member of a certain economic class. For instance, the consumption functions
of the land-owning nobility will only respond gropingly and unwillingly to a
downward or upward change in the marginal utility of money (p. 474). This
and similar processes are excluded from Comparative Statics. What is missing
is a “theory of the change of data”. While “the ﬁrst problem of economics”
concerns a given state of the economy, its second problem is: “How does an
economy accomplish the transition from one level ... to another level? This is
the question about the essence of economic evolution.” (Entwicklung I, 465–6;
cf. S1912a, 94)
AlthoughComparativeStaticsislimitedtothe“ﬁrstproblemofeconomics”,
Schumpeter nevertheless considered it a major contribution to the toolbox of
economic analysis. The serious application of this tool requires “higher math-
ematics”, that is, advanced forms of integral and differential calculus. Since
the design of Wesen excluded the demonstration of the use of these methods,
he stated that “I hope soon to have the occasion to add what is missing in this
respect” (p. 445). This came close to a promise of delivering the book that
he later called “The Theoretical Apparatus of Economics, in which I want to
improve the quantitative methods of modern economics” (BL, 283). Wesen,
however, concentrates on persuading the reader with only rudimentary math-
ematical skills that “higher mathematics” is needed. The major example used
for this persuasion is the rather equation-dense analysis of the effects of the
introduction of a quantity tax on a particular good (Wesen, 484–97). Schum-
peter applies properties of the functions deﬁned implicitly by the Walrasian
system of simultaneous equations to answer the question what happens to the
optimal solution because of the imposed tax. The change of the price of the
good creates a chain reaction that is decomposed by means of Taylor’s formula.
The different elements of this decomposition is then studied by integration and
differentiation. The conclusion is that the controversy on tax issues emerges be-
cause different assumptions are made concerning the form of the functions and
because some elements of the decomposition are ignored. A shorter analysis of
protective tariffs on imports also reveal that protectionist arguments normally
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Since Schumpeter never developed these sketchy arguments into a system-
aticuseof“highermathematics”,onemightsuspectthatthisneglectisbasedon
lacking mathematical skills. This is hardly true. Even thirty years after he had
abandoned higher mathematics as his personal research tool, his contributions
to Rudimentary Mathematics for Economics and Statisticians (S1947c, 106–9, 129–
33, 159–79) were clearly superior to those of the main author, William Crum.
The real reason for abandoning Comparative Statics and the related types of
mathematics is to be found in the seriously limited range of problems that they
cover. Of course, it we are willing to renounce on a high level of precision, we
may by means of Comparative Statics “force our way towards the problems of
Dynamics” (Wesen, 518). How far we can come in this way, however, in an
empirical question. Schumpeter clearly thought that the results with respect to
the “problems of Dynamics” would not be satisfactory for him: “We can never
surge into their core; the great tendencies of development [Entwicklungsten-
denzen] surely go past our systems, plays on other scenes. We perceive their
voices only as the rumbling of a distant thunder.” (p. 518) According to him,
these “tendencies of development” could not be derived from the type of eco-
nomic agent on which Comparative Statics is, more or less explicitly, founded:
Even the ordinary process of the economy is full of life and movement and
has to be conceptualised in steady evolution [Entwicklung]. However, we
stand puzzled towards the phenomenon of evolution and the “high prob-
lems” of economic progress. ... [Furthermore,] our picture of daily life ...
is in danger of being judged falsely since it conjures a state of rest that exists
nowhere. What a pitiful miserable ﬁgure he is, our economic subject who is
always looking so anxiously for equilibrium. He has no ambitions and no
entrepreneurial spirit; in brief, he is without force and life. (Wesen, 567)
This exclamation is not implying that such search for equilibrium is absent
from economic life. Instead, it means that something essential is missing in the
Walrasian model. What Schumpeter missed, he most clearly suggested in his
second book:
The men who brought forth modern industry were ‘all-of-a-piece people’
and not pathetic ﬁgures who steadily asked whether each effort that they
had to perform really gave a sufﬁcient surplus of utility. They worried little
about the hedonic [pleasure-searching] fruits of their deeds. ... Such men
create because they cannot do otherwise. (Entwicklung I, 137–8)
Schumpeter wanted to develop a model of economic evolution that imple-
mented this vision—and part of the solution was ready at hand: the response
of the Walrasian System interpreted as reﬂecting the routine-based behaviour
of ordinary agents—especially its core agent: the Walrasian entrepreneur. He
did so by introducing another type of entrepreneur:
• The Walrasian entrepreneur adapts to the changed parameters of the eco-
nomic system and thereby contributes to the equilibration that system.
• The Schumpeterian entrepreneur disturbs the equilibrium by buying and
using resources to change one of the ‘parameters’ of the economic system.
Schumpeter later presented the dichotomy between the W-entrepreneur
(called the “mere manager”) and the S-entrepreneur as one of the three di-
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Box 3: Schumpeter’s early interpretation of the Statics–Dynamics dichotomy
Although the concepts of Economic Statics and Evolutionary Dynamics had been
presented in Wesen, the fact that they served to implement his elite–mass di-





The process of introducing
new combinations
Method Modiﬁed Walrasian analysis Schumpeterian analysis of
the introduction of novelty
Type of agent Adaptive agents (mass) Temporarily creative agents
(elite) as well as adaptive
agents
This table serves to emphasise that the early Schumpeter merged areas of study,
methods, and types of agent—but the focus is on the latter. The static method of
neoclassical equilibrium analysis is related to a semi-realistic version of the adap-
tive equilibration toward a stationary economy by mass behaviour. The dynamic
method is only seen as covering the introduction of novelty into the economic sys-
tem by the innovative elite. It thus concerned the change of the parameters that
adaptive agents (the mass) react upon; and the issue of simple economic growth
was assumed away since it was considered both trivial and unrealistic. The early
Schumpeter also argued that his version of the Statics–Dynamics dichotomy di-
rectly explains the essence of the waveform movement of economic activity by
bursts of innovative behaviour. However, the later Schumpeter tried to disentan-
gle the different elements of his theoretical studies.
[O]ur position may be characterised by three corresponding pairs of oppo-
sites. First, by the opposition of two real processes: the circular ﬂow or the
tendency towards equilibrium on the one hand, a change in the channels
of economic routine or a spontaneous change in the economic data arising
from within the economic system on the other. Secondly, by the opposition
of two theoretical apparatuses: statics and dynamics. Thirdly, by the opposi-
tion of two types of conduct, which, following reality, we can picture as two
types of individuals: mere managers and entrepreneurs. (Entwicklung II,
120–22; see also Development, 82–3)
These three “pairs of opposites” obviously relate to the overall dichotomy
betweenStaticsandDynamicsthatSchumpeterappliedinhisyouth(seeBox3).
He saw Statics as using the static toolbox for the study of the routine-based
Circular Flow and the movement towards it through the action of adaptive
managers. Similarly, Dynamics used the dynamic toolbox for the study of the
change of the routines of the economic system as initiated by the activity of the
S-entrepreneur. Thus, he initially thought that there was something like a one-
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7. The cyclical process of economic evolution
The role of the S-entrepreneur is to change the routinised economic system.
This creation and recreation of “modern industry” is characterised by actions
developed on the background of an equilibrated price system. The creation of
a new production function sets forth a series of changes of other production
functions and of the consumption functions that in the end lead to an equili-
brated economic system that is based on a new foundation. This equilibrium
sets the stage for another round of modernisation. Although this idea can be
seen as loosely related to Comparative Statics, it concerns the “higher problem”
of the evolution of the routines of economic life instead of presupposing them
as ﬁxed.
Assuming that Schumpeter had this process in mind, it is not difﬁcult to
recognise how he reacted to Part VII of Walras’s Elements. At that point of his
book, Walras has already moved through a series of approximations to eco-
nomic reality. Thereby, “the system of the economic universe reveals itself, at
last, in all its grandeur and complexity: a complexity at once vast and simple,
which, forsheerbeauty, resemblestheastronomicuniverse”(Walras, 1954, 374).
However, he continues by sketching a couple of further approximations to real-
ity under the heading “Conditions and Consequences of Economic Progress”.
He ﬁrst deals with the reproduction of equilibrium as a stationary process—like
the closed input-output system that reproduced year after year in Quesnay’s
Tableau Économique:
We shall suppose the basic data [parameters] of the economic problem ...
to remain ﬁxed, so as to give us something in economics analogous to what
is called a stable system in mechanics. Moreover, we shall assume not only
that the preliminary phase of groping has been completed with equilibrium
established in principle, but also that the phase of static equilibrium has ac-
tually commenced, so that equilibrium is established in fact. (p. 378)
Here Walras has moved from his an abstract study of equilibrium to a sta-
tionary equilibrium. In Austrian terms, this is a routine-based equilibrium into
which the S-entrepreneur can be introduced. However, Walras does not con-
sider this possibility. Instead, he simply assumes the exogenous change of the
“data”, i.e. the parameters, of his model of the economic system. Hence, when
he turns to the step of passing “from the static to the dynamic state”, he sup-
poses “the annual production and consumption, which we had hitherto repre-
sented as a constant magnitude, change from instant to instant along with the
basic data of the problem” (p. 380). As examples of these data he mentions
“the initial quantities possessed, the utilities of goods and services, the tech-
nical coefﬁcients, the excess of income over consumption, the working capital
requirements, etc.” The change of these data means that the economic system
is “perpetually tending towards equilibrium without ever actually attaining it,
because the market has no other way of approaching equilibrium except by
groping, and, before the goal is reached, it has to renew its efforts and start
over again”. Therefore, “the market is like a lake agitated by the wind, where
the water is incessantly seeking its level without ever reaching it.” (p. 380)
Schumpeter obviously did not consider exogenous parameter change as
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analysis that was introduced in the last edition of Elements. Walras’s argu-
ment here is made in terms of production functions. The exogenous change
of these functions is deﬁned as “technical progress brought about by science”.
Schumpeter must have insisted that S-entrepreneurs are needed for bringing
such possibilities into practice. The endogenous change is brought about by
the cost-minimising movement along a given production function. Here Wal-
ras envisages “a case of economic progress resulting from saving.” (p. 386) This
hint about a simple theory of economic growth was not supported by Schum-
peter, however. In Wesen (300), he states that “the theory of saving forms one
of the weakest points of economics.” Although this phenomenon can be in-
cluded into the model of static equilibrium, the theory says nothing about in-
vestment inphysical capitaland the formationof fortunes (pp. 304–11). Even in
this case, the S-entrepreneur seems needed to bring forth the long-term change
of production functions. Therefore, there is no essential difference between
Walras’s two types of “progress”. In both cases, Schumpeter focussed on the
S-entrepreneurs that introduce new technical coefﬁcients and new goods and
services. This introduction presupposes new needs for working capital and
changes in the possession of resources. The response to the resulting disequi-
librium is a tâtonnement process that moves toward new standards. Therefore,
Schumpeter must have thought that the analogy between the disequilibrated
Walrasian System and an agitated lake that strived towards a gradually increas-
ing level is misleading. This problem becomes even clearer when Walras (1954,
380–1) turns to the problem of crises:
It can happen and frequently does happen in the real world, that under
some circumstances a selling price will remain for long periods of time
above cost of production and continue to rise in spite of increases in output,
while under other circumstances, a fall in price, following upon this rise,
will suddenly bring the selling price below cost of production and force
entrepreneurs to reverse their production policies. For, just as a lake is, at
times, stirred to its very depths by a storm, so also the market is sometimes
thrown into violent confusion by crises, which are sudden and general dis-
turbances of equilibrium.
Here Walras has obviously moved into Economic Dynamics without the
necessary analytical tools. Schumpeter’s emerging theory could be used to
reinterpret these statements as reﬂecting the activity of S-entrepreneurs. If the
reaction to entrepreneurial projects are slow, then their selling prices remain
above costs for a relatively long period; and the average prices can increase
because of the additional demand for resources created by a group of such
projects. However, when this type of demand disappears, the average prices
will fall below the costs of at least those following old routines, and their eco-
nomic responses are either adaptation or bankruptcy. This is what Schumpeter
later called “the perennial gale of creative destruction” (Capitalism, 84). He
also used the analogy of a lake, or an ocean, to describe his problem. For in-
stance, he stated that “the waves of the economy does not always return to the
same level as the waves of the ocean does, they indeed oscillate around a level
but not always around the same one”. Therefore, we need an answer to the
second great problem of economics: the movement from one level to another
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Schumpeter ﬁrst presented his vision and analysis of crises as part of eco-
nomic evolution in his large, and recently translated, paper “On the Nature of
Economic Crises”. This paper has largely been ignored since most of it was
included verbatim in Chapter 6 of Entwicklung I. However, this chapter in-
cludes a never repeated and condensed account for the major elements of his
general evolutionary analysis (S1910b, 5–16, 50) and it, furthermore, was ex-
tensively rewritten for Development. In any case, we recognise Schumpeter,
like Marx and in contrast to most other economists, chose “to look to business
cycles for material with which to build a fundamental theory of capitalist real-
ity.” (History, 1135) This means that the early Schumpeter did not connect well
to the literature on crises and business cycles. What Schumpeter’s paper “On
the Nature of Economic Crises” added to that literature is largely the sketchy
demonstration that an evolutionary theory of crises follows from his general
theory of economic evolution. To demonstrate this, the paper has to announce
this general theory in staccato before turning to the problem of crises. This se-
quence also seems to reﬂect the underlying research work. Although Schumpe-
terhadstartedhisresearchworkbywonderingaboutthecrisesphenomenon, it
was the problem of interest and proﬁt that led him to his general theory. Since
he connected this theory with “the modern theoretical ediﬁce of economics”
through a well-deﬁned “chain of considerations”, it is important that his spe-
ciﬁc “crisis theory” follows “as a simple consequence” from the general theory.
Furthermore, it was for him noteworthy that this general theory “was not de-
veloped with this purpose in mind” (S1910b, 5n). However, this statement can
alsobeinterpretedthespeciﬁcationofaproblem: Schumpeter’searlyandquick
move into the issues of crises and business cycles continued to trouble him for
the rest of his life!
LetusjumpdirectlytotheconclusionsthatSchumpeterformulatedmidway
between Wesen and Entwicklung I. He ended his paper by proposing that “the
fundamental ideas of our argument can be summarised in the following the-
ses”; and then he listed nine theses (S1910b, 50; see also Andersen (1994, 40–4).
Theses 6–9 concern the application of Schumpeter’s basic evolutionary scheme
for the study of economic crises while Theses 1–5 that summarise Schumpe-
ter’s basic evolutionary scheme in a highly abstract way. The latter theses are
(S1910b, 50):
1. Static and dynamic processes: “The economic processes fall into two sep-
arate and, in practice, clearly distinguishable categories: static and dy-
namic.”
2. Dynamics as economic evolution: “The dynamic category constitutes the
pure economic development [Entwicklung], that is, those changes in the
appearance of the economy that develop out of the economy itself.”
3. ‘Development’ as disturbance: “Economic development [Entwicklung] is
essentially a disturbance of the static equilibrium of the economy.”
4. Movement toward equilibrium: “This disturbance causes a reaction in
the static masses of the economy; namely, a movement towards a new
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5. Equilibrium through reorganisation: “The process of convergence to the
static state [Statisierung] necessarily creates an end to each speciﬁc phase
of development and causes a reorganisation of the value and price system
of the economy and a general ‘liquidation’.”
Thesis 1 states that it possible to follow Clark in using the Statics–Dynamics
dichotomy for the analysis of the economic processes. However, Thesis 2 de-
parts from Clark. While he included both exogenous and endogenous change
of the economic structure into dynamic analysis, Schumpeter excluded the for-
mer from his analysis and speciﬁed the latter as economic evolution. Thesis 3
adds that the phase of ‘development’ basically has to be considered as the
disturbance of a general “static” (that is, stationary) equilibrium. The distur-
bance may be speciﬁed as a change of the parameters of the economic system.
Thesis 4 tells that the (innovative) disturbance provokes the response of “the
static masses” in the direction of a new equilibrium. In the original formula-
tion, Schumpeter used the German word “Statisierung” to denote his version
of the tâtonnement process. Thesis 5 describes the equilibrating process as the
adaptation to the new system of marginal value and price. It emphasises that
the adaptive response by the “static masses” is not an easy one. Instead, the
Schumpeterian tâtonnement implies that at least some of the old economic po-
sitionsleadtobankruptcyratherthanbecomingadaptedtothenewparameters
of behaviour. Elsewhere in the paper, Schumpeter stated that it is not only the
development itself but also the “spasms of the collapse” after a crises that cre-
ate “untenable situations” that can “be transferred only step by step—after trial
and error [par tâtonnement]—into an equilibrium state.” (S1910b, 44)
As we have already seen, the ﬁve theses were not designed for the study of
economic crises. The rest of the theses serves to claim a place for Schumpeter’s
general theory of economic evolution in the literature on the problem of crises
(S1910b, 50; translation corrected):
6. The scheme and the cycles: “These statements [Theses 1–5] explain the
phenomenon, which is popularly characterised as the change between
prosperity and depression.”
7. Crises due to abnormal equilibration: “During the process of convergence
to a static state and, especially, during the time of its inception, collapses
can easily develop, which we term economic crises par excellence [kat’ ex-
ochén] and which render the process ‘abnormal’.”
8. Exogenous causation of crises: “The economy—and, indeed, this includes
the static economy—is also exposed to coincidental disturbances, which,
if they are sufﬁciently signiﬁcant, can cause such crises.”
9. The unimportance of exogenous causation: “But these [exogenously de-
termined] crises present no problem, they can indeed be effortlessly un-
derstood. They are not fundamentally related to a uniform phenomenon,
carry no deeper common characteristics and do not arise from a necessity
inherent in the economy or any of its special organisation. In relation to
them the prevailing view, that crises occur if a large disturbance breaks
out somewhere in the economy, is not only correct but fully exhaustive.”8. Conclusion 28
Let us start with Theses 8–9. They point out that economic crises may have
exogenous causes (like bad harvests or the ending of war activities). According
to Schumpeter, the economic consequences of such phenomena can easily be
handled by means of Economic Statics. However, the basic issue is whether or
not the economic system has an intrinsic tendency to produce recurrent crises.
With respect to the capitalist economy, the answer is yes; but the argument
is not easy to ﬁnd in Theses 6–7. Instead, these theses simply postulate that
Schumpeter’s scheme can be used for the explanation of business cycles and
crises to the extent they are generated from within the economic system. The
immediate reason for the difﬁculty of understanding these theses is that the
whole paper had dealt with the question, so Schumpeter could summarise his
results brieﬂy. Elsewhere he stated that the ﬁrst entrepreneur paves the way for
the next, and so on. Thereby their developmental activity may obtain macroe-
conomic importance. Furthermore, such a process of “economic development”
is necessarily brought to an end by the forces that promote equilibrium:
The counter-movements do not merely obstruct development, they put an
end to it. A great many values are annihilated; the fundamental condi-
tions and presuppositions of the plans of the leading men in the economy
are changed. The economic system needs rallying before it can go forward
again; its value system needs reorganising. And the development which
starts again is a new one, not simply the continuation of the old. (Develop-
ment, 217; cf. S1910b, 17)
Thus, Schumpeter emphasised that the complicated process of returning to
equilibrium from a highly disequilibrated state puts a brake on further inno-
vation. As a result, the innovative demand that had created the prosperity
disappears; and, at that point, the economic system can easily collapse into de-
pression. However, the economic system will reach a new equilibrium from
which a new round of innovation and adaptation can begin.
It is clear from even a very quick inspection the paper (and Chapter 6 of Ent-
wicklung I) that this claim is only based on theoretical deductions from the gen-
eral evolutionary theory. However, the literature in which this theory wanted
a place was heavily empirically oriented. Therefore, Theses 6–7 cannot be con-
sidered conclusions but rather a research programme. The core tasks of this
programme are to demonstrate that there is a real tendency toward a stationary
economy and that this tendency punctuates any phase of economic develop-
ment. Schumpeter often ignored these tasks. Even in Development (83n), he
stated that the “stationary economy is ... an incontrovertible fact, apart from
the fact ... that there is a tendency towards a stationary state in every period
of depression.” Although these statements are hardly incorrect, they do not
substantiate the claim of a simple coupling between his theoretical waves of
evolution and the facts of business cycles.
8. Conclusion
The above interpretation of the complex Schumpeter–Walras relationship can-
not be proved in all detail. It seems highly plausible, however. Thereby, it
helps to resolve what, probably, is the most difﬁcult of Schumpeter’s manyReferences: Schumpeter 29
paradoxes. For instance, Morishima and Catephores (1988, 42) represent the
idea of the Walrasian Schumpeter: while it is “generally believed that Schum-
peter’s hallmarks were the terms ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘innovation’, and ‘new pro-
ductive combination’”, these concepts and the underlying ideas are actually “a
direct extension of Walrasian concerns.” Schumpeter has also been presented
as a “Walrasian Austrian” (Schefold, 1986), while Freeman (1990, 28) has sug-
gested that Schumpeter was a non-Walrasian but bound to Walrasian tools of
analysis: “it was Schumpeter’s misfortune that he attempted to marry it [the
Walrasian equilibrium theory] with his own theory of dynamic destabilizing
entrepreneurship”. Others see him as an eclectic whose approach involved
“brilliant mixture, if not always an internally consistent” blend of “Marxism,
Walrasian equilibrium analysis, and German historical scholarship” (Rosen-
berg, 1986, 209). All these statements are true if we do not take them too lit-
erally. Schumpeter was inspired by Walras even with respect to Economic Dy-
namics; his Austrian background had some inﬂuence; his Walrasian tools did
create problems; and, as we shall see in the next chapter, he did include inspi-
ration from Marxism and the Historical School. However, Schumpeter created
his evolutionary theory as a new combination of all these, and several other,
backgrounds.
The ﬁrst version of his personal research programme is found in the con-
cluding section on the “Prospect on Dynamics [Ausblick auf die Dynamik]”
(Wesen, xxxiv, 614–22). Here he stated that the process of “crystallisation” of
Economic Statics should be allowed to fulﬁl its purifying mission. The resid-
ual of economic issues that cannot be be handled by emerging “crystal” is a
mixed bundle. This bundle includes the problems of economic evolution. The
reintegration of these problems would undermine the coherence of Economic
Statics and be of little help to the development of analytical tools for an Eco-
nomic Dynamics that can only be understood as the Schumpeterian variant of
Evolutionary Economics. Leaving the problems to the members of the Histori-
cal School was also unsatisfactory. They had done an important job with facts
and theories about details but there was no indication that they would turn
to formal theorising. Hence the task was left to Schumpeter. The earlier pre-
sented quotation from Wesen is a kind of summary of the guiding principles
for his evolutionary research: “it shall always stay our principle to be silent—or
... to delimit ourselves to summaries of facts—about things on which we have
nothing exact or sufﬁciently interesting to say.” Although the ultimate goal was
“exact” modelling, there was also a need for summarising the stylised facts of
economic evolution and for sketching out theories of the most interesting of
these facts.
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